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6.1  Introduction 
Since the end of the cold war, the world economy has become more in- 
tegrated. Cooperation between firms in different countries is the new trend. 
In particular, direct investment is one of the main strategies firms use to 
gain access to foreign markets. The Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development reports: “International direct investment grew rap- 
idly and from more countries during the 1980s. . . . Mergers and acquisi- 
tions  and  strategic alliances became  important  investment vehicles  as 
companies tried to increase sales quickly and cheaply. Steady economic 
growth, market integration, the globalization of  business, the growth of 
regional economies, and technological innovation were behind FDI’s (for- 
eign direct investment) growth in the 80s. What happens in the 90s will 
depend largely on these factors” (OECD 1992). 
Indeed, one of  the chief arguments against the North American Free 
Trade Agreement was that a large portion of manufacturing activities in 
the United States and Canada would be relocated to Mexico, producing 
the alleged “giant sucking sound.” It was also reported that a major reason 
behind the initiation of APEC was U.S. fears that Japanese firms would 
move in and have a headstart in the East Asian market, building their own 
networks and excluding outside competitors. 
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Thus the effects of economic integration cannot be fully understood if 
we  do not take FDI into consideration. In this paper, we  focus on eco- 
nomic integration in the presence of international joint ventures (JVs). We 
have in mind the case of Japanese firms. They export to other Asian coun- 
tries. But facing restrictions  on trade and investment, they also directly 
produce in these countries. According to Japan’s Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI 1994), nearly 70 percent of Japanese FDI in 
manufacturing to other Asian countries is in the form of JVs, probably 
due to legal limits on local ownership by  foreign firms. Most of the pro- 
duction by these Japanese firms is sold in local markets. 
International JVs are one type of strategic alliance between firms in dif- 
ferent countries. As explained in Harrigan (1985) and Contractor and Lor- 
ange (1988), they are formed for various reasons. A project may be carried 
out jointly by  more than one firm when the cost of the project is enor- 
mous. Restrictions on foreign ownership of local firms or trade barriers 
may facilitate the formation of international JVs, as in the case of Japa- 
nese firms. 
In spite of the increase in international JVs in the real world, there have 
been few  developments in  their theoretical  analysis. Svejnar and Smith 
(1984) introduced the Nash bargaining approach to study JV profit shar- 
ing in  less  developed  countries.  Abe  and Zhao (1994) extended  their 
framework to include competition between parent firms and examined the 
effects of trade barriers on resource allocation and welfare. 
In the present paper, we  model an international JV that aims to over- 
come trade barriers and to take advantage of low wage costs. We use this 
model to investigate the effects of economic integration on output, profits, 
and welfare. The international JV is located in a developing country. It is 
operated by a local firm and a firm from a developed country, both located 
in the integrated region. The product of the international JV is sold locally. 
The developed country also exports both an intermediate input and the 
final product to the developing country, subject to import tariffs in the 
latter country. 
Economic integration in this paper is defined as a reduction of tariff 
rates within the integrated region. JovanoviC (1992) identifies five types of 
international economic integration: free trade area, customs union, com- 
mon market, economic union, and total economic union. “Economic inte- 
gration” in this paper means a free trade area (FTA). The goal of an FTA 
is to remove tariffs and quotas on trade within the integrated region, but 
it allows each member country to keep its own original trade restrictions 
against nonmember countries. An example is the North American Free 
Trade Area, whose member countries will remove internal trade barriers 
in several steps.’ 
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Our main results show the following: (1) Economic integration has two 
major effects. First, it reduces the tariff on the final output imported from 
the developed country, which in turn increases the exports and profits of 
the parent firm in the developed country and decreases the output of the 
international JV located in the developing country and the profits of the lo- 
cal firm. Second, economic integration also reduces the tariff on the inter- 
mediate input imported into the developing country, which in turn reduces 
the output of the parent firm in the developed country but raises that of 
the international JV in the developing country. However, the profits of the 
parent firms in both countries increase, and the welfare in the developing 
country may also rise. (2) A subsidy to the JV reduces the output of the 
foreign firm but raises that of the JV and the total supply in the developing 
country. (3) A subsidy to the JV raises the profits of both parent firms and 
the welfare of  the developing country if  the level of JV output is low 
enough. 
The results above imply that economic integration may increase or de- 
crease the welfare of the developing country, depending on whether the 
developing country imports the intermediate input  from the developed 
country or not. The subsidy to the JV is a policy that is acceptable to both 
countries because it raises profits in both countries. This is perhaps why 
subsidies are adopted in various forms by  many developing countries in 
order to attract FDI. 
Viner (1950) first showed that economic integration could lead to trade 
creation and trade diversion. The former occurs because member coun- 
tries eliminate internal tariffs, which leads to an expansion of trade; the 
latter occurs because member countries still keep positive tariffs against 
nonmember  countries,  which  “diverts”  trade  to the member  countries. 
Trade creation improves welfare because it results in efficient allocation of 
resources, while trade diversion could reduce welfare because it discrimi- 
nates against the most efficient producers-the  nonmember countries. 
Viner’s classical results are derived under perfect competition. In the 
present paper, we consider economic integration in an oligopolistic market 
structure. Furthermore, we  allow the exporting country to produce di- 
rectly in the importing country in the form of an international JV. A reduc- 
tion in the import tariff raises imports from the developed country. How- 
ever, the parent firms of the JV adjust JV output to maximize their joint 
profits. Thus changes in tariff rates affect the allocation of production in 
the two countries, but not total production, under a technology of con- 
stant marginal cost. As a consequence, economic integration in the present 
model does not lead to trade diversion through the change in the import 
tariff on the final output, even though trade creation occurs (in the sense 
that trade volume expands). In addition, the welfare of the developing 
country may be lowered by the reduction in the tariff on the final output. 
Section 6.2 develops the basic model. Section 6.3 investigates the condi- 194  Kenzo Abe and Laixun Zhao 
tions needed for the JV to be formed. Section 6.4 examines the effects of 
economic integration. Section 6.5 analyzes the impact of the subsidy. Sec- 
tion  6.6 explains how our model works if  the subsidy appears in other 
forms and provides some concluding remarks. 
6.2  The Model 
Consider a firm X located in a developed country A (e.g., Japan), which 
exports output of its final good, x, to a developing country B (e.g., a cer- 
tain country in Southeast Asia). The exports are subject to a tariff, t. To 
evade the tariff and to take advantage of a lower wage rate, firm X offers 
to form an international JV with a firm Y in country B. The international 
JV produces the final good also. Its output is denoted by y. For analytical 
simplicity, we  assume firm Y does not produce  alone.2 The production 
of final goods in both countries requires an intermediate input, which is 
produced in country A only. Country B imposes a tariff, T,  on the imported 
intermediate input from country A. In order to attract FDI, the host coun- 
try offers a subsidy to the international JV. For each unit of its output, the 
JV receives a subsidy of s,  which is eventually divided between the parent 
firms X and Y. 
In addition to countries A and B, there is a collection of other countries, 
which is called country C. Because we  want to focus on the effects of 
economic integration on the JV and firm X, we  assume that firms in the 
other countries behave competitively and that they produce the final good 
using their own intermediate inputs. Let firm Z be a representative of these 
firms. Firm Z also exports its final product to country B, subject to a tariff, 
tZ.  Then the export supply function of country C can be written as 
(1)  z  =  F(P - t"), 
where P  is the price in country B, taken as given by firm Z, and F > 0.3 
The price P  (also the inverse demand function in country B) is derived as 
follows. Let the demand function in country B be 
(2)  D(P)  =  x +  y  +  z 
Then from equations (1) and (2) we obtain4 
(3)  It  =  x +  y  =  D(P)  - F(P - t") =  d(P). 
2. Our model can be extended to include independent production by firm Y straightfor- 
wardly. 
3. If  F'  = 0, then our model corresponds to one without  the third country. Our main 
results remain valid, though the formation of the FTA  or the subsidy does not affect out- 
put 2. 
4. Since we  do not change t'  throughout this paper, we suppress it in the inverse demand 
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Thus P  = P(v) =  d-’(v) is the inverse demand function for firm X and the 
international JV. We assume P’(v) = dP(v)/dv < 0 and 2P’(v) + vP”(v)  = 
We consider a two-stage problem. In the first stage, firm X decides how 
much to export to country B, given the tariffs and the subsidy to the inter- 
national JV.  In the second stage, firms X and Y negotiate to form and 
operate the JV. This sequential structure can be justified on the grounds 
that in practice, many developed countries first export to developing coun- 
tries. Faced with trade restrictions  or production  cost disadvantages  at 
home, they begin to undertake FDI in the form of wholly owned subsidi- 
aries .or JVs. 
For consistency, let us first consider the second stage. The formation of 
the JV is determined by a Nash bargaining process between parent firms 
X and Y If bargaining  is  successful, the JV is formed and it produces 
output y. While the JV uses labor in country B and an intermediate input 
imported from country A, firm X uses labor and an intermediate input ob- 
tained in a competitive market in country A to produce the final output. 
The unit production cost functions for firm X and the JV are, respec- 
tively, 
2P’(v) + vdP’(v)/dv < 0. 
(44  ex =  hX(wX,m), 
(4b)  CJ  =  hJ(WY,m  +  T), 
where wx and wy  are the exogenous wage rates in countries A and B, re- 
spectively, m is the exogenous price of the intermediate input in country 
A, and T is the tariff on the imported intermediate input. 
The JV’s profit function is then written as 
(5)  VJ(X,Y,  7,  s)  = [P(v)  +  sly - cJy, 
where s is the unit subsidy to the JV. Thus the profit functions of firms X 
and Y are obtained: 
(6) 
(7)  .5ry(X,  Y,  a,  7,  3)  = (1 - O1)mJ(X,  Y,  7,  S), 
where 01  is firm X’s  share of  JV profits and t is the tariff rate on the im- 
ported final good x. All profit functions are assumed to be concave in x, 
y, and 
If bargaining breaks down, the international JV does not produce. Then 
the profits of firms X and Y become 
V~(X,~,(Y,~,T,S)  = [P(v)  - t]x - cxx  +  o~v~(x,~,T,  s), 
(84  rIX(x,t)  = [P(x)  - t]x - cxx, 
5. We  suppress wx, wy,  and m in the profit functions because we do not change them in 
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(8b)  ny  =  0. 
The combination of these profits is the threat  point  of this bargaining 
game. 
Parent firms X and Y bargain over the output level and their shares of 
the profits of the international JV, given the other variables. We define the 
Nash product as 
(9)  H(x,  y,  a,  t,  7,s)  =  [.rrX(X, y,  a,  t,  7, $1 - nx(x,  t)lP 
x  [TY(X,  y,  a,  7, s)l’-P, 
where P is the relative bargaining power of parent firm X. 
The solution to this game is obtained by maximizing the Nash product 
with respect to y and a.  Then the first-order conditions can be written as 
away =  H[P(+ - IIX)-~+  (1 - P)(~Y)-~~;I  =  0, 
=  H[P(+ - IIX~  - (1 - p)(+-qT~ =  0, 
where a subscript on a function represents the partial derivative of the 
function with respect to the subscripted variable throughout this paper; 
for example,  ~r,” = dTrx(x,y,a,t,7,s)/8y, and  ‘rryY  = d~r~(x,y,a,~,~)/dy.  Re- 
arranging these equations, we obtain 
(104 
(lob) (1 -  P)[T~’(X,Y,  a, t,  7, S) - nx(x,  t)] -  ~IT’(x,~,  CY,  7, S) = 0. 
Tr;+  Tr;  =  P(v)  +  vP’(v)  +  S - CJ  =  0, 
Equation (loa) implies that the parent firms maximize their joint profits 
through the JV by  choosing output; while equation (lob) states that the 
two parents should divide the profits of the JV in such a way that the net 
gains from running the JV are equal for both parties, adjusted according 
to their relative bargaining power. These two conditions determine JV out- 
put and profit shares as functions of output x;  that is, y(-)  = y(x;t,~,~,p) 
and a(.)  = .(X;~,T,S$). 
Now we turn to the first stage, in which firm X maximizes its own profits 
given in equation (6) by choosing the level of output, taking into consider- 
ation that y and 01  are functions of x.  Substituting y(-)  and .(.)  into equa- 
tion (6), we  obtain the first-stage profit function of firm X as 
(6’)  +rX(X,  t,  7, S, PI  = TX(X,  A.1,  4.13  t,  7,  S) 
= [P(X + y(.)) -  t]X -  CxX + a(.)k’(X,  ,V(.),  7, S), 
where +tJ(x,y(.),~,s) = [P(x  + y(*))  + sly(.) -  cJy(.>.  It is important to note 
the difference between the profit function in the first stage (in eq. [6’]) and 
that defined by equation (6). The former function includes solutions of y 
and a as functions of x,  obtained by solving the second-stage game, that 
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The first-order condition to equation (6’) is given by 
(1 1)  i-i;  =  a.irx(.)/ax =  0, 
which can be expressed in the following expanded form, from the ap- 
pendix: 
(11’)  P(v) -  t + vP’(v) -  cx = -[(l -  P)/P][P(X) -  t + xP’(x) -  CX]. 
The right-hand side of equation (1 1  ’) is negative (as shown in conditions 
[12] and [13] in the next section). The left-hand side of equation  (11’) 
would be the marginal profit if firms X and Y merged to become a monop- 
olist. Thus condition (1 1 ‘) implies that the own production of firm X is 
larger than the level of output if firms X and Y merged and acted as a 
monopolist. This occurs because firm X can improve its threat point pay- 
off in the second-stage bargaining game if its output is increased (condi- 
tion [13]). 
6.3  The Equilibrium 
The equilibrium for this economy is determined by  conditions (loa), 
(1 Ob), and (1 1  ‘). Given the policy variables t,  T, and s,  these three equa- 
tions determine y, a,  and x. 
We first investigate the conditions for the JV to be formed; that is, the 
JV  produces positive output and is jointly operated by  the two parent 
firms: y > 0 and 0 < P < 1. Differentiating equation (8a) with respect to 
x,  we obtain 
(12)  n;  =  P(x) - t  +  xP’(x) - cx > P(v)  - t  +  vP’(v) - cx 
= -[(I  - P)/PIT 
The inequality arises because v >  x,  y >  0,  and P(v) + vP’(v)  is decreasing 
by assumption; that is, 2P  ’(v)  + vP  ”(v)  < 0. The second equality in equa- 
tion (12) is the same as condition (1 l’). Condition (12) then implies 
(13)  n;  > 0, 
given that 0 < P < 1. Thus, by comparing conditions (10a) and (A5) in 
the appendix, we must have 
(14)  Tr;+  Trf  <  Tr;+  Tr;, 
P(v) - t  +  vP’(v) - CX <  P(v)  +  s +  vP’(v) - CJ. 
which expands as 
Using conditions (4a) and (4b), it finally boils down to 
(14’)  hJ(WY,WZ +  7) <  hX(WX,WZ)  -k  S +  t. 198  Kenzo Abe and Laixun Zhao 
Expression (14’) is the necessary condition for the JV to be formed. It 
implies that in equilibrium, given the combination of the government pol- 
icy variables t, T, and s, the wage rate in country B must be low enough 
to satisfy condition (14’). Otherwise, the JV is not formed. This result is 
supported by the fact that, in practice, many developed countries under- 
take FDI in developing countries to take advantage of low wages6 
A related question is when the JV degenerates to full-ownership FDI by 
firm X. So far we  have assumed the bargaining  powers of both parent 
firms to be exogenously given. But suppose both governments can impose 
some policy to affect the bargaining powers, then as p -+  1, that is, as 
parent firm X’s bargaining power approaches 100 percent, from equations 
(lob) and (7) we have 
(15)  lTy(X,y,  (Y,  7,  S)  =  0  = (1 - (Y)‘d(X,jJ,  T,  S). 
If the subsidiary in country B produces positive output, then T~(x,~,T,s) 
> 0. It follows that  CY = 1 by  condition (15); that is, the JV approaches 
to full-ownership FDI by the foreign parent firm. 
Note that besides legal limits on foreign ownership in host countries, in 
practice JVs are preferred to full-ownership FDI for various reasons. For 
either partner, the JV lowers total production costs relative to going it 
alone; the JV also enables each partner to benefit from the comparative 
advantage of the other. The foreign parent may bring better technology, 
while the local parent knows the domestic market and culture. 
6.4  The Effects of Economic Integration 
In this section, we  analyze the impact of economic integration. When 
countries A and B form an FTA, import tariffs on both the final output 
and the intermediate input from country A are reduced. The two cases 
are analyzed sequentially. We  consider the equilibrium with an internal 
solution, that is, x > 0, y > 0, z > 0, and 0 <  CY < 1. 
Since CY does not appear in equations (loa) and (1 lr),  these two equa- 
tions determine the outputs of firm X and the international JV.  By total 
differentiation, we  obtain 
where M = 2P’(v) + vP”(v)  < 0, M, = 2Pr(x)  + xP”(x)  < 0, and k is the 
amount of the imported intermediate input required to produce one unit 
of JV output. The determinant is 
A  = -(I  - p)MM,/p  <  0,  if,  #  1. 
6.  As will be shown in later sections, the tariff on the final good and the subsidy to the JV 
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6.4.1  The Tariff on Final Good Imports 
Using condition (16), we obtain the effects of the tariff on final output: 
(174  dxldt  =  -A-'M/P <  0, 
dyldt  =  A-'M/P > 0, 
dvldt  =  0, 
dzldt  =  F'P'(dv1dt)  =  0. 
From conditions (17a) and (17b), a decrease in the import tariff on the 
final good raises the output of firm X but reduces that of the JV by the 
same amount. This occurs because, for any tariff rate and any level of 
output x determined in the first stage, the parent firms adjust JV output 
in the second stage to maximize their joint profits. Under the constant 
marginal cost of the JV, the total output of countries A and B remains 
constant. As a consequence, imports from country C to country B are not 
affected.  In  turn,  total  supply  from  the  three  countries  remains  un- 
changed. Hence, neither the price nor the consumer surplus is affected by 
the tariff on the final good. 
The effects of t on the profits of the parent firms are examined next. 
Substituting y(.) and a(-)  into condition (lob), and differentiating with 
respect to a policy variable i (= t, T, s, respectively), we  obtain 
[(l -  IT: - II:)  - p.rrr]dx/di + [(l - p)$  - P.rrF]dyldi 
+  ddaldi + (1 - P)(a,"-  II:)  -  =  0, 
which can be rearranged to yield (for i = t, T,  s,  respectively) 
(18)  ddaldi = -[(l  - P)(T:-  II:)  - p.rr:]dx/di 
+ [PIT;-  (1 - P).rr;]dy/di - (1 - P)(.rr,"-  II;)  +  PT:. 
Using equations (6), (7), and (18) with i = t, we can establish 
(19)  d.rrXldt  = .rr:dx/dt + .rr;dy/dt + .rrJda/dt  + .rr: 
= [P(T:  + T:) + (1 -  p)IT:]d~ldt   IT;  + r:)dy/dt + T: 
= -x < 0, 200  Kenzo Abe and Laixun Zhao 
In deriving the above, we have used conditions (lOa), (1 3), and (A5) in the 
appendix. As expected, a drop in t reduces the profits of the JV but raises 
those of firm X, even though firm X owns a share of the JV. The reason is 
that firm X is producing less than the optimal level for exporting to coun- 
try B, due to the tarif€. 
Now we  turn to the more important question-welfare  implications. 
The welfare function in country B is the sum of the consumer surplus, 
Uy(x  + y + z),  firm Y’s profits, tariff revenues on imports from countries 
C  and A (including both the final output and the intermediate  input), 
minus the subsidy: 
(21)  Wy  =  U‘(X  +  y  +  Z) +  IT’  +  tx +  Tky +  tZz - S’Y. 
We assume that the tariff revenue is transferred to consumers directly and 
the subsidy to the JV is financed by a lump-sum tax on  consumer^.^ Thus 
the government budget is balanced. 
Differentiating equation (21) with respect to t yields 
(22)  dW’ldt  =  PD’dPIdt  +  dnYldt +  x +  tdxldt 
+ (Tk - 
dn’ldt  +  x +  tdxldt + (Tk  - 
s)dy/dt +  t’dzldt 
=  s)dY/dt, 
where D(P) = x + y  + z, dUYldt = PD’dPldt = 0, and dzldt  = 0 by 
conditions (17c) and (17d). The first term on the right-hand side of equa- 
tion (22) is the effect on firm Y’s profits, which is positive. The last three 
terms are the effect on government revenue in country B. If  t and s are 
sufficiently small, this effect is positive because dyldt >  0. Thus a reduction 
in t will reduce welfare in country B if t and s are sufficiently small. 
Economic integration results in lower internal import tariffs in the inte- 
grated region. From the above, we can state one effect of economic inte- 
gration, which is the effect brought about by the reduction of the import 
tariff on the final output of firm X. 
PROPOSITION  1.  In the presence of the international JK the formation of 
the FTA leads to trade creation in that it raises the exports of the devel- 
oped country to the developing country, while it reduces the output of the 
JK It increases the projits of the parent jirm in the developed country but 
reduces those of the parent jirm in the developing country. Finally, it re- 
duces the welfare of the developing country if the tariff and the subsidy to 
the JV are suficiently small. 
The profits of firm X increase because economic integration reduces 
production  distortions in  country A by  lowering tariffs imposed on its 
7. Note that we call  Uy(x + y  + z) the consumer surplus, although we  assume that the 
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exports to country B. This causes JV output to decrease, which reduces 
parent firm Y’s profits. Because total supply of the good and in turn con- 
sumer surplus in country  B are not affected, welfare in  country  B de- 
creases. 
6.4.2  The Tariff on Intermediate Input Imports 
Economic integration also reduces the tariff on the imported intermedi- 
ate input. From condition (16), we obtain the effects of the tariff on the 
intermediate input as 
(234  dxldT  =  kA-’M > 0, 
(23b) 
(23c) 
dyldT  =  -kA-’[M  + (1 - p)M,,/p]  <  0, 
dv/dT  =  -kA-’(l  - p)M,/p  <  0, 
(234  dz/dT  =  P’P’dv/dT  > 0. 
Thus a decrease in the import tariff on the intermediate input used by 
the JV raises the output of the JV but reduces those of firms X and Z. This 
occurs because firm X reduces its output in expectation of the increase of 
y. In addition, condition (13) shows that the decrease in x also reduces 
firm X’s threat point payoff, which raises firm X’s net gains in the bar- 
gaining game for the JV (i.e., the difference between the regular profit and 
the threat point payoff decreases). This makes firm X less aggressive in 
negotiations. As a consequence, the reduction in x is less than the increase 
in y, which causes the price to decrease and in turn raises the output of 
country C. It follows that the net effect is an increase in the total supply of 
final output from the three countries. As a result, consumer surplus rises. 
The effects of T on the profits of the parent firms can be obtained by 
using equations (6), (7), and (18) with i = T: 
(24)  dnX/dT =  n:dx/dT  -t  nyXdy/dT +  nJda/dT + nr 
=  @(IT?  +  IT;) 
=  -pky  <  0, 
(25)  dnYldT =  n:dx/dT  +  n:dy/dT - n’da/dT 
=  (1 - p)(~:+ T:) - {[(l - p)/p]II;}dx/d~ 
=  -[(l - p)/p]II;d~/d~  - (1 - p)ky  <  0. 
Conditions (24) and (25) imply that a decrease in T will raise the profits 
of the JV as well as those of firm X. Even though firm X’s exports fall, its 
total profits rise because its revenue from the JV is increased due to the 
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Next, using equation (21), we obtain the welfare effect of r: 
dWYldT =  PD'dPIdr  +  d.rrY/dT +  tdx1d.r +  ky  (26) 
+ (rk - s)dyldr +  t'dzldr. 
The sign of equation (26) is ambiguous. But if t, tZ,  s, and y are sufficiently 
small, then dWldr approximates the expression PD'dPldr + d.rry/dr + 
rkdyldr. Thus it is negatively signed; that is, a reduction in T  will  raise 
welfare in country B. 
Summarizing the above, we can state a second effect of economic inte- 
gration. 
PROPOSITION  2. Economic integration between the developed country and 
the developing country also reduces the tariff rate on the imported interme- 
diate input.  In the presence  of  the international JY it reduces thejinal 
good exports of  the  former to the latter, while it raises the output of  the 
JK  It increases theprojits of  the parentjirms in both countries. For small 
values of  the  policy variables, it also raises weIfare in the developing coun- 
try if JV output is small initially. 
From propositions  1 and 2, economic integration as modeled in the 
present paper has two (somewhat) opposing effects: On the one hand, it 
reduces the tariff on the final good imported from the developed country, 
which in turn increases the exports and profits of the parent firm in the 
developed country and decreases the output of  the international JV lo- 
cated in the developing country, the profits of the local firm, and welfare 
in the developing country. On the other hand, it also reduces the tariff on 
the intermediate input imported into the developing country, which in turn 
reduces the output of the parent firm in the developed country but raises 
that of the international JV in the developing country. However, the profits 
of the parent firms in both countries increase, and welfare in the devel- 
oping country may also rise. 
6.5  The Government Subsidy to the Joint Venture 
In this section, we investigate the impact of  the government subsidy to 
the international JV. From condition (16), we  obtain 
(274  dxlds  = -  A-'M  <  0, 
(27b) 
(274  dvlds  =  A-'(1 - p)M,,/p > 0, 
dylds  =  A-'[M + (1 - p)M,/p]  > 0, 
(274  dzlds  =  F'P'dvIds  <  0. Joint Ventures, Economic Integration, and Government Policy  203 
As expected, a subsidy to the JV raises the output of the JV and reduces 
those of the foreign firms. But the increase outweighs the reduction, and 
the net effect is an increase in the total supply and a reduction in the price. 
The effects of  the subsidy on the profits of the parent firms can be ob- 
tained by using equations (1  6)  and (1  8): 
(28)  d.rrx/ds =  T:dx/ds +  TyXdyIds +  T'dalds i-  TI 
=  PY  > 0, 
(29)  dTYlds =  TrdXldS i-  T:dy/dS  - T'dciIds +  T: 
=  -[(l - P)lP]II;dxld~  + (1 - P)y > 0. 
Thus the profits of both parent firms are increased by  the subsidy to the 
JV, even though parent firm X's output is reduced. Firm X is more than 
compensated by the increase in its profits from the JV. 
Using equation (21), we obtain the welfare effect of the subsidy as 
(30)  dWYlds =  PD'dPIds +  dTy/ds  -t  tdxlds - y 
+ (Tk - s)dy/ds +  t'dzlds 
The sign of expression (30) is ambiguous. But if t, tZ,  s,  and y are suffi- 
ciently  small,  the  welfare  change  can  be  approximately  expressed  as 
PD'dPlds + d.rry/ds + rkdylds. Then it is positively signed; that is,  an 
increase in s  will  raise welfare in country B.  Thus the subsidy to the JV 
works almost exactly like a reduction in the import tariff on the intermedi- 
ate input the JV uses. 
We are now in a position to state the impact of the subsidy to the JV. 
PROPOSITION  3. A subsidy to the international JV reduces the outputs of 
the  foreign  firms but raises that of the JV  and the total supply of  the good 
in the developing country and reduces the price. It increases the profits of 
the  parent firms in both countries. For small values of the  policy variables, 
it also raises weEfare in the developing country if  JV output is small ini- 
tially. 
Note the above restrictive conditions for welfare to increase in country 
B.  If the values of the policy variables are large, the welfare effect of the 
subsidy is ambiguous; and if  JV output is large, the cost of the subsidy 
outweighs the gain in country B, resulting in a welfare loss because a por- 
tion of JV profits goes to firm X while country B bears the whole cost of 
the subsidy.* 
8. Also, in a more general framework, a subsidy to one sector is a cost to other sectors, 
which may bring inefficient allocation of resources and result in a welfare loss in the whole 
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6.6  Concluding Remarks 
This paper used a simple model to analyze economic integration and 
other trade policies in the presence of an international JV in a developing 
country. We  showed that while economic integration benefits the firm in 
the developed country, it may increase or decrease the welfare of the devel- 
oping country, depending on whether the developing country imports an 
intermediate input from the developed country or not. A policy beneficial 
to both countries is a subsidy to the international JV. 
In practice, the subsidy posited in the present paper can appear in vari- 
ous forms (see Slemrod 1995; Sumantoro 1984; China, Ministry of  For- 
eign Relations 1987). For instance, many developing countries (e.g., China 
and the ASEAN countries) provide tax concessions to attract FDI, based 
on JV  output, or on the volume of  foreign capital attracted, or on the 
amount of local content used by the JV. In such cases, our model and re- 
sults would remain the same if we assume fixed-coefficient production tech- 
nology; that is, subsidies or tax credits to outputs work the same way as 
those on inputs. Some countries also allow accelerated depreciation in 
JVs. As can be seen in equation (5), accelerated depreciation is similar to 
a reduction in unit cost, c’,  by  some proportion, which  brings the same 
effects as the subsidy s. Another common form of tax holiday is a reduc- 
tion of  the corporate tax paid by  the JV.  Such a policy is  qualitatively 
similar to a subsidy to JV output, which would not alter the results of the 
present paper. 
The purpose of the paper has been to construct a model addressing the 
major pattern of FDI in East Asia, that is, shared ownership, and policies 
related  to economic integration. In doing so, we  have abstracted from 
modeling FDI from countries outside of the integrated region. Our model 
can be extended to include the situation in which the outside country C 
also forms a JV in the developing country. The developing country may 
gain by  “playing off” the two foreign countries against each other, that 
is, making simultaneous but independent  offers to form JVs with both 
countries. If bargaining in one game breaks down, the threat point payoff 
for the developing country is positive because it can form a JV with the 
other foreign country. 
Often a developed country undertakes FDI in a developing country and 
sells the final product in a third country. If outputs are sold in a country 
outside of the integrated region, our results on output and profits remain 
valid but those on welfare may change. In particular, because consumer 
surplus disappears in country B, the level of welfare falls in country B for 
each of the policies we have analyzed. 
Suppose instead of forming an FTA, country B conducts unilateral tar- 
iff  reduction for all imports, then the effects on resource allocation and Joint Ventures, Economic Integration, and Government Policy  205 
welfare can be studied by letting dtz = dt < 0. Certainly a reduction in t 
raises x and reduces y, but by equation (3), a reduction in tz may reduce 
both x and y. The total effects depend on the elasticity of the inverse de- 
mand curve and are generally ambiguous. 
Many Japanese firms produce in Southeast Asian countries (e.g., Thai- 
land) and import back to Japan, to take advantage of low wages. Although 
the structure of our model is a little different, our paper can still shed light 
on such cases. Suppose Thailand imposes a tariff on intermediate inputs 
imported from Japan and Japan imposes a tariff on final outputs imported 
from Thailand, then economic integration reduces both types of tariffs, 
which increases both Thailand’s imports of inputs and its exports of final 
outputs. As a result, welfare in both countries may rise. 
Some developing countries encourage local firms to form JVs with for- 
eign firms in order to obtain better technology. In this paper we have ab- 
stracted from analyzing endogenous technology transfer. We  conjecture 
that a subsidy to the JV would increase such technology transfer. 
Appendix 
This appendix derives an explicit expression for condition (1 1). Note that 
(Al)  hJ  + +if  =  (T;  +  r;yr +  ‘rr;ar)  + (T:  +   IT;^, + nzg) 
=  (T;+  Tf) + (T;+  T;)yz + (Tf+  T:)cY, 
=  IT;+  Tf, 
because T;  + T;  = 0 by condition (loa) and T:  + ~f = 0 by differentiat- 
ing equations (6) and (7) with respect to a.  Then condition (11) can be 
expressed as 
(A21  +;  =  (Ti;+  Tf)- ;It: =  0. 
Moreover, equation (lob) is satisfied for any x and s when y = y(.) and 
a  = a(.).  Differentiating equation (lob) with respect to x, we obtain 
043)  (1 - P)(&J-  n;) -  =  0. 
From equations (1 1) and (A3), we establish 
(A4)  6; =  -[(I  - P)/P]II: 
=  -[(I  - P)/P][P(X)  - tX  +  xP’(x) - cF(x)]. 
Therefore, from equations (A2) and (A4), we obtain 206  Kenzo Abe and Laixun Zhao 
(A51  IT;+  IT;  = -[(l - P)/P]ry, 
which can be expanded as in equation (1 1  ’). 
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Comment  Shin-ichi Fukuda 
This paper presents a simple but interesting model to analyze economic 
integration and trade policy in the presence of an international joint ven- 
ture in a developing country. A key characteristic of the paper is its theo- 
retical analysis of FDI by focusing on trade restrictions, especially tariffs 
and subsidies. The approach is quite different from that of other papers in 
this volume, most of which analyze issues related to FDI empirically by 
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allowing various possible factors but paying relatively little attention to 
their theoretical background. Thus the contribution made by this paper is 
unique and important for this conference. In addition, although the model 
structure is complicated, most of the derived propositions are unambigu- 
ous, so their policy implications are clear. 
However, most of the propositions in the paper hold only under the 
restrictive assumptions of the model. This type of criticism may not be 
appropriate when  the purpose of this paper is  only intended to satisfy 
theoretical curiosity. But when pursuing some practical policy implications, 
we  need to think about the more general “role of foreign direct investment 
in economic development” that provides the title of this conference. There- 
fore, from more practical points of view, I will mainly comment on what re- 
strictive assumptions this theoretical paper may have imposed. 
My first comment is on the welfare effects of international joint ventures 
or FDI in a developing country. In addition to the low wage rates in a 
developing country, there are two reasons why international joint ventures 
are profitable for a developed country in this model. One is the existence 
of trade restrictions, more specifically the existence of a tariff. Because the 
developed country can avoid tariff payments by  undertaking joint ven- 
tures, it obviously has an incentive to begin joint ventures with the devel- 
oping country. The other reason is a government subsidy to joint venture 
firms. Because exporters cannot obtain this subsidy, it produces another 
incentive to start joint ventures. Needless to say, both are important fac- 
tors in making joint ventures profitable. However, in explaining the welfare 
effects of FDI, the paper did not mention several important welfare gains 
that the developing country may enjoy. 
Among the possible welfare gains, at least the following two factors are 
important. One is  the technological spillover effects that joint ventures 
may have on local companies. Several papers in this volume explore exten- 
sively what technological spillover effects FDI can have. But these effects 
are completely neglected in this theoretical model. Modeling technological 
spillover effects is difficult because we  need to extend the static model to 
a dynamic one. But even without a formal theoretical  analysis, we  can 
easily imagine that FDI will  have various technological spillover effects 
and may benefit the developing country a lot. The other important factor 
is  the creation of new  employment in the developing country. Usually, 
before joint ventures start, most workers are employed in traditional sec- 
tors, such as agriculture, whose returns are very low. Therefore, putting 
aside welfare gains from tariffs and subsidies, joint ventures can bring an 
important welfare gain to the developing country. 
My second comment is on the definition of “economic integration.’’ In 
this paper, economic integration is defined as a reduction  of tariff rates 
within the integrated region. Given this definition, the propositions de- 
rived in the paper are plausible. However, the definition is a narrow one, 208  Kenzo Abe and Laixun Zhao 
applicable in an early stage of economic integration. In fact, when we 
think of economic integration, we  usually expect wider effects than those 
that tariff rate reduction will have. 
One possible effect is the scale effect from integration. Although eco- 
nomic integration can have several types of scale effects, most previous 
theoretical and empirical studies have pointed out that it would have posi- 
tive impact on the integrated region. Allowing additional factors such as 
increasing returns to scale in production, it is  desirable to incorporate 
scale effects into the model for practical considerations. Another impor- 
tant effect of economic integration is that of monetary integration such as 
the European Monetary System. Monetary integration is usually consid- 
ered desirable because it reduces the effects of exchange rate volatility on 
intraregional trade. Since it is not standard to introduce money into this 
type of trade model, this may not be an appropriate criticism of the theo- 
retical analysis. However, in considering economic integration practically, 
monetary aspects are also far from negligible. 
My final comment is on the policy implications of this paper. Given the 
various assumptions, the derived propositions are correct and clear-cut. 
However, even if we accept the assumptions, the propositions indicate only 
the direction of changes and say little about the quantitative changes that 
tariff cuts or subsidies would cause. In considering practical policy impli- 
cations, it is more important to see how large the effects of a tariff cut or 
subsidy will be. I think that this would be possible by  specifying profit 
functions in the model. In addition, various comparative statics analyses 
were done in order to discuss the second-best welfare implications of each 
policy. But it would be more desirable to discuss which policy is better 
than the others in terms of welfare more rigorously. 
Comment  Mahani Zainal-Abidin 
The paper by  Abe and Zhao investigates profit allocation  among joint 
venture partners in an economic integration. The joint venture is between 
a firm in a developed country (A) and another firm in a developing coun- 
try (B). The production of the joint venture and its output are sold in the 
developing country. The paper starts with the premise that because of the 
imposition of tariffs on imports into the developing country, a firm that 
exports final goods into that developing country would go into a joint 
venture with a firm from the developing country to avoid the high tariff. 
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Besides avoiding the high tariff, the joint venture was formed to take ad- 
vantage of the low labor costs in the developing country. The viability of 
the joint venture rests on the assumption that it receives a subsidy from 
the developing country’s government.  The developing country also im- 
ports the same final goods from another country, C, and these goods are 
subjected to the same level of import duties. The model is then expanded 
to allow for the use of an intermediate input imported from the developed 
country in the production of the final good. The ensuing economic inte- 
gration in  the form of a customs union lowers the tariffs on both final 
and intermediate goods. This leads to the reallocation of production level 
between the parent company in the developed country and its joint ven- 
ture as well as affecting the level of welfare in the developing country. 
With the advent  of  an economic integration, the unchanged  level of 
imports from country C and the output combination between the joint 
venture and its parent company in the developed country as proposed in 
this paper need to be examined more closely. Imports from country C will 
have a distinct price disadvantage when the tariff on similar imports from 
country A, which has now formed a customs union with country B,  is 
lowered. The reallocation of output must then involve all three producers, 
and  country  C’s  output  cannot  remain  unaffected.  Faced  with  higher 
prices, imports from country C will decline. This leaves the total supply 
to be shared between the joint venture and the parent companies. A lower 
tariff in the developing country does not necessarily mean that production 
of the joint venture will decrease while that of the parent company in the 
developed country will increase. This proposition is true if the tariff is the 
only reason why the joint venture was established. However, in the model, 
high wages in the developed country were assumed to be one of the push 
factors, and one of the equilibrium conditions is that the wage rate in the 
developing country must be low enough for the joint venture to take place. 
In addition, the joint venture was given an incentive in the form of a sub- 
sidy that will lower its cost of production or increase its profits. Therefore, 
when the tariff is reduced, the output of the joint venture may not drop 
because of these other two factors (wage rate and subsidy) that sustain 
profitability. 
The paper uses a Nash bargaining position to represent the interest and 
returns to both the joint venture partners and includes a parameter to 
represent this variable. However, the bargaining position is largely seen 
from the point of view of the parent company in the developed country. 
The government of the developing country, which gives the subsidy, has 
quite a strong bargaining position to ensure that its interest is also pro- 
tected. Thus, rather than taking a passive role as implied by  the model, 
the government of the developing country will want to influence the out- 
come of the game. In fact, it can set conditions on the joint venture, espe- 
cially if  there are political pressures from domestic constituencies, since 210  Kenzo Abe and Laixun Zhao 
the benefit of incentives will be mainly enjoyed by a foreign company, as- 
suming that the local partner is neither involved in the production process 
nor in possession of the technological capability. The conditions imposed 
may be in the form of a tax on the profits accruing to the joint venture 
(direct condition) or indirect ones such as employment objectives (usually 
a requirement  that  a certain number  of local staff members be hired), 
transfer of technology, or a local content target. The imposition of these 
conditions is more likely if the local joint venture partner is a public sector 
company, in the sense that it has to meet government requirements. There- 
fore, the bargaining position should reflect the more active position of the 
developing country government. 
Another aspect that has not been considered in the paper is that if the 
developed country also imposes a tariff on imports of similar goods, eco- 
nomic integration (customs union) will require this tariff also to be re- 
duced. The commonly cited advantage of economic integration is that it 
results in trade creation and not trade diversion; with lower tariffs, produc- 
tion will be reallocated to the lowest cost producer. In this model, if the 
developing country has lower labor costs, the joint venture’s output should 
increase, not otherwise. In a customs union all members have to reduce 
their tariffs. In this case, if the developed country had previously protected 
its market for the product that it exports to the developing country, this 
product now can be produced much more cheaply in the latter because of 
lower labor costs. Production will be then be relocated from the developed 
to the developing country. A good example is the increase in output of the 
automotive industry in  Turkey. Prior  to Turkey’s entry into a customs 
union with the European Union, some EU automotive producers had es- 
tablished joint ventures to penetrate the Turkish market. But since Tur- 
key’s entry into the customs union with the European Union, these Euro- 
pean  producers  have  made  Turkey their  production  base  because  the 
output, which is now produced much more cheaply, can be exported back 
into other EU developed member economies with lower tariffs. 
Proposition 2 in this paper needs to be analyzed carefully. It says that 
economic integration, for small values of the policy variables, raises wel- 
fare in the developing country if joint venture output is small initially. This 
proposition is contrary to the aim of the joint venture, which is to increase 
output in  order to augment the welfare of the population. If  output is 
limited and a subsidy has to be given to produce the output, there is then 
no justification for the existence of the joint venture. The issue of welfare 
can be related to two aspects-the  assumption about the subsidy and the 
definition of  welfare. Although the paper has covered various forms of 
subsidy, their inclusion in the joint venture profit equation could be varied. 
In particular, the most important kind of subsidy, exemption from pay- 
ment of income tax given on the basis of the amount of capital invested, 
could not be assumed to be proportionally constant to units produced. 
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the subsidy decreases as output increases, assuming that output perfor- 
mance partly reflects time period. Thus the cost of the subsidy to the gov- 
ernment  diminishes as output expands,  and consequently, welfare  will 
also increase. 
The definition of welfare should be expanded to include employment 
generated and export revenue. It is acknowledged that a high proportion 
of international joint ventures in developing countries do not create as 
much benefit as expected. Studies have shown that about 30 percent of 
foreign investment costs the host country more in terms of the opportunity 
cost of  its resources than it earns from the investment (Helleiner 1989). 
The benefits are especially questionable for foreign investment located in 
free trade areas where these companies are given exemptions from export 
and import taxes. Why then do developing countries still encourage for- 
eign joint ventures even though they seem to reduce welfare and can only 
increase profits to the private sector? Welfare is viewed in a wider context 
where employment creation is considered a vital spillover in developing 
countries usually faced with the problem of high unemployment. When 
joint venture products are exported, the welfare effect becomes even more 
important because of the large employment potential as well  as export 
revenue contribution. Many developing countries suffer from balance-of- 
payments constraints that can hinder economic growth, and hence the 
ability to generate export revenue features prominently in the government 
decision to grant a subsidy to joint ventures. Thus the welfare effects of 
a foreign joint venture extend beyond consumer surplus, private sector 
profits, and tariff revenues. 
This paper constructs a general model to elucidate the effects of eco- 
nomic integration on international joint ventures, but it cannot fully meet 
its objective of explaining the major pattern of FDI in East Asia. First, 
East Asia has not followed the route of customs union toward economic 
integration. Most countries in the region opt for unilateral trade liberaliza- 
tion or multilateral trading arrangements. In these types of liberalization, 
tariff levels are usually low and direct benefits that can be given by devel- 
oping countries to joint ventures are minimal because companies from 
outside the integration  region can enter and compete effectively in the 
domestic markets. In the case of ASEAN, a free trade area has been pro- 
posed, but ASEAN members’ external tariff rates, on average, are quite 
low. Meanwhile, many ASEAN members have introduced tariff reduc- 
tions, and the liberalization is offered to all trading partners. For existing 
joint ventures in ASEAN, even though they now have a tariff advantage, 
the surplus is getting smaller as a result of the tariff liberalization. 
Second, most joint ventures do not produce final products for domestic 
markets but are instead part of the production  chains of multinational 
companies.  Initially, joint  ventures  in  ASEAN  assembled intermediate 
goods that were later exported. Then joint ventures became almost fully 
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some of the R&D work, production of the intermediate goods, assembly 
of the products, and marketing to third countries. Joint ventures gained 
more autonomy and became more independent from their parent compa- 
nies. In other words, joint ventures matured while economic integration 
(in the form of tariff reduction) was taking place. 
This paper makes a commendable effort to analyze the existence of a 
joint venture  in  the context of economic integration. The authors may 
want to consider expanding the model to include other features of the 
joint venture relationship, such as transfer pricing. Since the joint venture 
partner from the developed country is  the source and producer  of the 
product while the other partner (from the developing country) is assumed 
to be inactive in the production process, the former has an incentive to 
engage in transfer pricing. As a consequence, the profits of the joint ven- 
ture partner from the developed country may be higher than stated be- 
cause of inflated transfer prices. In this case, the implicit bargaining posi- 
tion of the joint venture partner from the developed country is stronger, 
as evidenced by its ability to achieve higher profits than the other partner. 
Thus its desire to form the joint venture is far stronger than the other 
partner’s, and this implies a weaker bargaining position. 
The specification of products is critical in this model because the impli- 
cations of  output level and share and profits depend on it. Most joint 
ventures, particularly in the ASEAN countries, are not aimed at serving 
domestic markets. If a joint venture is part of an international production 
chain and it processes intermediate goods that will be sent back to its 
parent company in a developed country, a lower tariff rate will  increase 
both the exports of intermediate goods by  the parent company and the 
output of the joint venture because the production cost of the latter is now 
lower. A similar conclusion holds if  the product is exported  to a third 
country. In such a situation, the subsidy consideration is  secondary to 
labor cost, which is the main reason why  firms undertaking FDI locate 
their production in East Asia. 
In conclusion, the model offers interesting propositions about a joint 
venture under economic integration, which rest heavily on the provision 
of a subsidy. Under the restrictive conditions stated, the model provides 
propositions about how a joint venture between firms from developed and 
developing countries could be mutually beneficial. However, the test of its 
validity lies very much with the empirical conditions prevailing and the 
variations of its assumptions. 
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